Western Kentucky University

TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects

Graduate School

1-1985

In Search of the Grail: The Poetic Development of
T.S. Eliot
William Bell
Western Kentucky University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the Literature in English, British Isles Commons
Recommended Citation
Bell, William, "In Search of the Grail: The Poetic Development of T.S. Eliot" (1985). Masters Theses & Specialist Projects. Paper 2151.
https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2151

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact topscholar@wku.edu.

Bell,
William R.
1985

IN SEARCH OF THE GRAIL:
THE POETIC DEVELOPMENT OF T.S. ELIOT

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of English
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, Kentucky

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
William R. Bell
April 1985

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THESIS

Permission is hereby
Library to
granted to the Western Kentucky University
ofilm or other
make, or allow to be made photocopies, micr
or scholarly
copies of this thesis for appropriate research
purpo seg.
es of this
reserved to the author for the making of any copi
scholarly
the iris except for brief sections for research or
purposes.

Signed

Date

Please place an "X" in the appropriate box.
thesis and will control
This form will be filed with the original of the
future use of the thesis.

iq

")
141 J --g-f`WYA

sIsau Jo ao4oGaTa

, G4ECTI)

papuauwoDau

LOY13 'S'I dO IN2Wd0r13Aal DII2Od 3H1
:TIV8C HHL d0 H38n'S Ni

IN SEARCH OF THE GRAIL:
THE POETIC DEVELOPMENT OF T.S. Eliot
William Ronald Bell
Directed by:

April 1985

59 pages

Dorothy McMahon, William McMahon, and
Frank Steele

Department of English

Western Kentucky University

In Poets of Reality, Joseph Hillis Miller seeks
to establish T.S. Eliot as a precursor of the modern
movement towards romantic. subjectivism.

By applying

his phenomenological critique, Miller claims that
several major modern writers, including Eliot, adopt
aesthetics based on various forms of philosophical
monism.
The point :nderlying this thesis is that Eliot
stands opposed to any such position and, until 1930,
breaks with philosophy, monistic or otherwise.

His

art from this period is instead characterized by a
search for solution in poetic artifice, a pure art.
However, with "Ash Wednesday," the poet once again
enters fully into the realm of ideas, and by
Four Quartets has achieved a synthesis of art and
idea that is clearly dualistic in nature and affirms
the importance of a progressive, and not destructive
tradition.

All of this he finally undergirds with

a logocentric belief in language as a vehicle to be
purified, far from the linguistic nihilism of Miller's
"Yale School" colleague, Jacques Derrida.
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Introduction

Writers should be approached on their own terms.
But in an age of special interests, it has not been
stylish to admit that most artists, particularly
modernist, have programmes with which they approach the
realms of aesthetics and metaphysics.

There was a

time, at the end of the 'seventies, when it looked as
though a revival of disinterested objectivity based on
eclecticism was possible, something that, despite its
claims, the New Criticism has failed to yield.

But

while the structuralist experiment may have failed, its
legacy continues in what Wayne Booth calls the more
recent "meta-meta-meta-criticisms."

Charles Altieri

has called Derridean theory "serial structuralism," and
Jonathan Culler, speaking of Deconstruction, affirms
that "this view is doubtless the legacy of New
Criticism."
I have chosen to take issue with Joseph Hillis
Miller's Poets of Reality because, while it may not
strictly qualify as a deconstructive text, it is one of
the most influential examples of what I call
contemporary parochial criticism, i.e. criticism with
an axiom to grind.

For Miller, this means romantic

subjectivism, that all major modernist poetry
constitutes "a return to some form of monism." In

Eliot's case, Miller says that the poet "begins in
exclusion and deprivation, then expands outward to
include all of time an space, and finally narrows
again"(p. 189).

Today, we find Miller working from the

same ideological base; although his essays may be more
overtly "linguistic," there continues to be a call for
subjective relationship.

I believe, however, that a

clear case can be made that, at least until 1930, Eliot
breaks with philosophy, monistic or otherwise.

His art

from ths period is instead characterized by a search
for solution in poetic artifice, a pure art.

However,

with "Ash Wednesday," the poet once more enters fully
into the realm of ideas, and by Four Quartets has
achieved a synthesis of art and idea that is clearly
dualistic in nature.
These things have implications on a far broader
scale.

Miller's basic philosophical stance is ti-lat

"there can be . . . no return to the traditional
conception of God," and subsequently there is only "a
fugitive spiritual power . . . within things and
people, not altogether beyond them"(pp. 10-11).

His

dialectic in The Disappearance of God and Poets of
Reality presents the culmination of Georges Poulet's
phenomenological critique, itself a part of the
nihilistic tradition.

It was Nietzsche who first

proclaimed that "God is dead," and bolstered the
romantic age with his Dionysian view of art.

His

process of self-negation continues to earn Nietzsche

favour with the deconstruction critics today,
themselves a product of the method called
"phenomenology."

Miller has recently said that he has

little trouble reconciling his present position with
his earlier reverence for Poulet's method; they are
both open-ended and self-negating.
A comprehensive definition of phenomenology would
be impossible, for its proponents are as diverse as
their existential cousins.

However, it is possible to

at least approach the school by way of its chief
spokesmen, Husserl and Heidegger.
Husserl had shaken the foundations of classical
epistemology by questioning the validity of Descartes'
"cogito" on the basis that even Descartes had adopted a
false framework upon which to proceed with his
dialectic.

By applying a method called "epoche,"

meaning "bracketing," Husserl proposed to negate what
he considered invalid--all existence beyond the
perception of the individual ego.

It was the resulting

subjectivity that Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger,
came to adopt as the basis for his own mature
phenomenology.

In his essay on "The Quest for Being,"

Heidegger begins a discourse that takes him into a
search for the pure "essence" of Being, which he
finally states is, at its core, "no-thing," literally
Nothing.

All that is left is to strip reality bare;

only then can he begin to reconstruct a new metaphysic.
"Each begins," says Miller, "with an experience of

nihilism or its concomitants, and each in his own way
enters the new reality"(p. 11).

It is here that

Heidegger has implications for the artist who can now
only float in the "aesthetic manifold," unable to grasp
any final reality beyond the "I," which will ultimately
fold in upon and negate itself.
The point underlying this thesis is that Eliot is
opposed to any such nihilism.

Not only is he laying

down a position of classical dualism, but it is one
that affirms the importance of a progressive, and not
destructive, tradition.

All of this he finally

undergirds with a logooentric belief in language as a
vehicle to be purified, far from the linguistic
negativism of Miller's "Yale School" colleague, Jacques
Derrida.
To some, my approach may seem too simple.

I make

no apologies for the absence of theoretic gymnastics,
which may, unless we are careful, give way to textual
manipulation.

If it takes a "double bifurcation" to

make Professor Miller's interpretation "work," then how
much more should we question his method rather than
revel in the brilliance of his approach?

The reader is

not asked to look for many original ideas here,
something to which Eliot himself laid no claims.

Our

publishing industry has, alas, been too often in the
business of promoting novelty at the expense of
honesty.

That is not to imply that there is nothing

more to be said about Eliot, only that there can be

rewards in taking inventory and synthesizing our
findings in order to bring unity to a life that was
itself painfully dedicated to that unity.
Poets of Reality has brought dialogue to the Eliot
question for which we should be grateful.

Ironically,

J. Hillis Miller's theory is destined to become, if it
has not already, a part of the tradition that he
presently denies, not to be destroyed but forever to
change and be changed as the old accommodates the new.
I wish to thank those members of the senior
English faculty of Western Kentucky University who have
helped in the composition of this essay, Dr. William
McMahon and Dr. Frank Steele.

I am particularly

grateful to Dr. Dorothy McMahon for her endless insight
and helpful direction.

Credit also goes to my wife,

Suzanne, a graduate student who understands.

On the Shore of All We Know (1904-1920)

It is proverbially easier to destroy
than to construct; and as a corollary of this
proverb, it is easier for readers to
comprehend the destructive than the
constructive side of an author's thought.

These words go a long way towards suggesting the
kind of allegiances that T.S. Eliot would have had in
today's literary world.

Perhaps he was even

anticipating the recent tides of deconstructive
criticism that were destined to misinterpret his own
aesthetic.

For, he tells us, if a writer possesses "no

constructive philosophy, it is not demanded; and if he
1
has, it is overlooked."

And so there are those,

hardly sharing Eliot's spirit, who would align
themselves quite unjustifiably with him.

J. Hillis

Miller, anxious for allies, claims that "in many
twentieth century writers there is a return to some
form of monism."2

Accordingly, Eliot is a prime

example.
Although Miller published these claims well in
advance of his courtship with Derrida and de Man, Poets
of Reality anticipates the marriage that was to take
place in the late 'seventies, marking Miller's entrance
into the Deconstruction fold.

The premise that he

2
posits in 1965 leads quite clearly to his more recent
conclusions.

His position is further reinforced by an

apparent reluctance to revise any judgements made on
Eliot in that book.

It is therefore fair to assume

that Miller's position has not changed.

Indeed, it has

probably intensified.
Miller's present critical stance is well known:

Each scholar is only one of a long line
of tillers of the soil; he justifies himself
by destroying the scholars who preceded him.
The publication of his findings is suicidal
in the sense that he is offering himself UP
to be deitroyed in turn by the next
scholar.

How different this is from Eliot's famous position in
"Tradition and the Individual Talent," in which the
task of the artist is the synthesize, not annihilate:

The existing order is complete before the new
work arrives; for order to persist after the
supervention of novelty, the whole existing
order must be, if ever so slightly, altered
. . . this is conformity between the old and
new. (SP, pp. 38-39)

Indeed, Miller's tone makes his critique sound like a
parody of Eliot's well established theory.

Only when

we read Miller's definition of "Deconstruction," "the
untangling of the inherence of metaphysics in nihilism
and of nihilism in metaphysics by way of the close
4
reading of texts," are we reminded of his
severity.

3
However, the purpose of this study is not to
destroy Professor Miller's methodology, for, in so
doing, it might only verify most of his claims.
Rather, the attempt here is to rectify several points
that would appear to make Eliot a precursor of the
modern movement towards romantic subjectivism, and to
provide an alternative, and it is hoped more
a

successful, perspective for this poet's eventful
career.

Because Deconstruction recognizes no meaning
outside the "prisonhouse of language,"5 it is
unequivocably committed to a monistic metaphysic.
Miller's point of departure, that "the monism of
immediate experience is the truth"(p. 135), provokes
the first of a series of yes-but's that demand close
scrutiny.

For, while Miller's essay is clever, it is

far too zealous in its debt to Neitszche to avoid
distortions.

To be sure, Eliot begins with "immediate

experience," but in his poetry this realm is translated
into a new unity; the creative process brings a state
of liberation, a kind of "stepping out" that would
otherwise be impossible.
Miller's interpretation of "The Lovesong of J.
Alfred Prufrock" is predictable: "The reader is plunged
with the first words into the spherical enclosure of
Prufrock's mind.

Everything exists because Prufrock

4
thinks of it"(p. 137).

With copious references to

Eliot's Harvard dissertation, Knowledge and Experience
in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, Miller proceeds to
drive the poet into metaphysical isolation.

"In his

essay on Leibniz and Bradley," we are told, Eliot
firmly rejects the latter's idea of an 'Absolute' which
unifies all finite centers"(p. 140).

Because the

dissertation "is more or less contemporary with his
early poems," Miller infers that it is "the starting
point from which all his later development emerges"
(p. 134).

It is hoped that this thesis will show that

the ideas in Knowlege and Experience are not the
"starting point," but rather the troublesome grain
under the skin that initiates Eliot's search for the
pearl of metaphysical resolution, a movement away from
monism rather than towards it.

For although Eliot's

ideas seem firm (such is the nature of a dissertation),
he is never completely comfortable with them; later, in
1964, he even goes so far as to say that he has grown
"unable to think in the terminology of this essay"
(KE, p. 10).
Miller makes two fundamental mistakes.

Firstly,

he leads us to assume that Prufrock is Eliot, itself an
absurdity, since an individual so impotent could surely
never create such a masterpiece.

And secondly, he

assumes that the early poetry is merely a vehicle for
the philosophical ideas that Eliot was exposed to in

the Harvard years.
It may be that an understanding of Bradley and
Leibniz is helpful in approaching Prufrock's more
difficult allusions.

In fact, The Monadology could be

to the poem what Jessie Weston's From Ritual to Romance
is to The Waste Land, a sort of map which, since it was
so vital in the composition, serves to guide the reader
through almost cryptic passages.

In this way, we can

frame Prufrock's need "to squeeze the universe into a
ball," or his strange desire to become "a pair of
ragged claws," otherwise impossible.6
But knowing what a persona is saying is not
necessarily understanding a poem, to which any reader
of Donne, Eliot's mentor, can attest.

Prufrock's

isolation and logical incongruity make him reminiscent
of Donne's fragmentary characters.

But while Donne's

men can make "one little room, an every where,"7
the poet himself adopts a far broader metaphysic.

It

is another seventeenth century writer who tells us that
"jocond his muse was, but his life was chast."8
Eliot, in the Metaphysical tradition, is not called
upon to show consistency of philosophy and artistic
content.

Later, in his essay on "Dante," he is to warn

against poetry's becoming a horse upon which philosophy
rides.

But even as early as 1918, Eliot commends Henry

James for "his mastery over, his baffling escape from,
Ideas," saying that such mastery is "perhaps the last

6
test of a superior intelligence"(SP, p. 151).

It is

for this very reason that Edmund Wilson rebukes Eliot's
"almost impossible attempt to make aesthetic values
9
independent of all other values," a definite
anathema to Deconstruction.

Geoffrey Hartman, in the

introduction to Deconstruction and Criticism, says that
"the separation of philosophy from literary study has
„10
not worked to the benefit of either.
trend did not begin with Eliot.

But this

Lionel Trilling

uncovers a similar tendency in Matthew Arnold when he
says that "it is the problem of the antagonism between
the creative imagination and the critical intellect
which lies at the heart of the romantic philosophy."
Perhaps Arnold was spreading the first seeds of the
"objective correlative" when he recognized that the
poetic form should be "in itself a meaning and a
'message.
When Eliot wrote his dissertation, it was as a
student of philosophy; when he takes up the poet's pen
it is to play a different game, one governed by a very
different set of rules.

This idea is shared and

perhaps best developed by a fellow New Critic, 1.A.
Richards, who, claiming that there are exclusive
standards for "poetical truth," decries the
introduction of "inappropriate kinds of believing into
poetry [for] to do so is . . . profanation of
poetry ."12

7
In 1917, Eliot stands, Kant-like, between two
spheres: the rationalism of Leibniz, demanding the
loneliness of J. Alfred Prufrock, and the idealism of
Bradley, allowing the free play of aesthetic values
based on a concept of absolute.

The freedom that

poetry gives to Eliot may suggest why, after leaving
Harvard, he abandons the formal study of philosophy;
there was perhaps a personal solution in poetic form.
Eliot's philosophical position, as far as we can tell,
does seem to indicate a definite return to Leibnizian
monadism; but aesthetically, the creative act provides
for the early Eliot what was not available to Prufrock:
the power of subject over object and a recognized
difference between them.

Although Miller gives lip

service to this dualism, he discredits its importance
by saying that it is "an alienation from reality"
(p. 135).

True to phenomenological form,

"consciousness" and "reality" become muddy in the
critic's mind, leading to an interpretation that in
uneffacedly romantic.
Eliot is not Prufrock.
same world.

Nor does he inhabit the

Miller's failure to recognize this

distinction leads him to conclude that "'objective
correlatives' are not invented by the poet.

They are

encountered in an all-inclusive subjective realm"
(p. 138).

But while Eliot's mind may not create

objective correlatives (they are, after all,

8
objective), it is not nearly so passive as Miller would
make it seem.

"When a poet's mind is perfectly

equipped for its work," says Eliot, "it is constantly
amalgamating disparate experience"(SP, p. 64).

Of

course, these words were not written until 1921;
however, judging by the frequency with which Eliot
employs the metaphysical conceit in this first decade,
he definitely had such things in mind.

Surely he was

thinking of Donne's "A bracelet of bright hair about
12
the bone,"
when he wrote: "Arms that are
braceleted and white and bare![But in the lamplight,
downed with light brown hair!)"(CPP, p. 3).

Fliot's

mind stands outside the material; thus Wilson is able
to conclude that "Eliot believes that a work of art is
not an oracular outpouring, but an object which has
been constructed deliberately with the aim of producing
a certain effect."14

Similarly, Richards sees the

job of the poet as giving "order and coherence, and so
freedom, to a body of experience..15

In his

"Reflections on 'Vers Libre,'" Eliot begins to lay down
the foundation for the poetic form that is to stay with
him for the rest of his life.

An adherence to

convention is important, and despite his personal
unrest, there is little to suggest that he is anywhere
near Miller, anywhere near anarchy--or nihilism.

For

"freedom is only truly freedom when it appears against
a backdrop of artificial limitation"(SR, p. 35).

9
It is unfortunate that we have very little
literary criticism from Eliot's first years as a poet.
It is perhaps more unfortunate that in 1965, Miller did
not have access to The Poems Written in Early Youth,
released by Valerie Eliot only two years later.

For

although these may not he counted among Eliot's best
poems, they show a part of his development that has, as
yet, received limited critical attention.
The young Eliot wro4-e about the anxieties and
concerns that would preoccupy any serious student.

The

prospect of a career in letters was no doubt a
challenge, as one of the earliest poems, [At Graduation
1905], begins with these formidable words:
Standing on the shore of all we know
We linger for a moment doubtfully . • •
No light to warn of rocks below,
But let us put forth courageously.
(PWEY, p. 11)
Perhaps the most striking feature of these poems is the
clear sense of optimism that seems to overcome the
uncertainty of his world.

And in "Song" we see Eliot,

for the first time, subordinating philosophy for a
poetic ideal, the power of Love:
If space and time, as sages say,
Are things that cannot be,
The fly that lives a single day
Has lived as long as we.
But let us live while yet we may,
While love and life are free,
Fot time is time, and runs away,
Though sages disagree. (PWEY, p. 10)

10
But all was not well with Eliot in those early
years.

He must have had "Spleen" in mind when he wrote

"Prufrock"; the diction and imagery are too similar to
have been composed in isolation.

Here, too, is the

world of "evenings, lights, and tea," inhabited by the
same protagonist "a little bald and gray,/Languid,
fastidious, and bland,/ .
suit."

. punctilious of tie and

This earlier poem is not so subtle and tells us

exactly what Eliot is thinking.

It concludes with the

character, "Life," who "waits, hat and gloves in
hand!(Somewhat impatient of delay)/On the doorstep of
the Absolute"(PWEY, p. 26).

The sentiment in this last

line is clearly Bradleian; it is the frustration of
"Appearance" and "Reality," more than the genuine grasp
of a monism.
Although he was surely uncomfortable with his
metaphysics after the Great War, Eliot was even more
distressed by the real life misery that surrounded him.
It is here that Miller misses the true genius behind
these poems.

To make Eliot walk in Prufrock's shoes is

to miss the cutting satire that permeates, for
Prufrock's disorder is not Eliot's.
All of the 1917 poems inhabit the same cruel
landscape, fractured inside and out, under the clumsy
weight of its own futility.

In Prufrock and Other

Observations, Eliot is creating a vast social drama in

11
which a cast of sharply or mildly grotesque characters
parades across a stage not unlike Joyce's Dublin.

It

is a place where "showers beat/On broken blinds and
chimney pots"(CPP, p. 12).

This is the world that

Prufrock leaves to make his "visit."
But the world of "tea and cakes and ices" is just
as

stagnant, in its own way, as the "tedious" streets

through which he has come.

For here one can do no more

that measure out one's days "with coffee spoons."

This

is the world that Henry James satirizes, of inactive
high society and brittle, dull gentility.

Its splendor

may seem incompatible with the squalour of "vacant
lots," but they are both, at their cores, bankrupt of
reality.
As its name suggests, Prufrock and Other
Observations presents images of a tragi-comic world
from which the poet is removed.

Eliot has taken

James's advice; he has set his characters in motion and
is watching them quite scientifically.

Hugh Kenner

notes that "it was genius that separated the speaker of
the monologue from the writer of the poem by the
solitary device of affixing an unforgettable
16
title."

The writer is aloof.

And yet there are

times when his voice breaks through, almost giving
asides, clues, to the reader who is watching with him.
One such comment appears, appropriately, in "Preludes,"
and serves to tell us what these scenes mean:

12

I am moved by fancies that are curled
Around these images, and cling;
The notion of some infinitely gentle
Infinitely suffering thing.

"Preludes," a series of short vignettes appearing in
the middle of the "Prufrock" collection, provides an
explanation of the "thousand sordid images" that Eliot
paints in the poems.

"You had such a vision of the

street," he writes, "as the street hardly understands."
It is this vision of suffering that allows him to so
sympathize with poor Prufrock that it is as if "his
soul stretched tight across the skies"(CPP, p. 13).
are invited into another man's mind.

We

Like Virgil,

Eliot dares us to follow, tracing psychological avenues
that will lead to an inner landscape, a world within a
world:

Let us go then, you and I,
As the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherised upon a table;
Let us go through certain half-deserted
streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent. (CPP, p. 3)

But Eliot always takes care to temper his internal
structures, not with the randomness Miller would like
to see, but with a sense of schema.

This is the true

significance of the Heraclitus passage: despite the
appearance of fragmented lives, his characters move and

13
relate in a general context of pattern.

Eliot

recognizes this same technique in Henry James when he
claims that each of the novelist's characters "is
extracted out of a reality of its own . . . everything
given is true for that individual; but what is given is
chosen with great art for its place in the general
scheme."

It is here, too, that Eliot first explores

the possibilities of cultural unity, since "the real
hero, in any of James's stories, is a social entity of
which men and women are constituents"(SP, p. 151).
James's short story "Crapy Cornelia," upon which
"Prufrock" is probably based in part, tells of a
forty-eight year old bachelor, extremely conscious of
his age, who sets out to propose marriage to a
presumably rich widow.

Upon meeting an old

acquaintance at the lady's home, he is distracted into
forfeiting his opportunity to pose "the question:" "He
had the happy consciousness of having exposed the
important question to the crucial test, and of having
escaped, by that persistent logic, a grave
17
mistake."

This kind of internal dialogue leads

to the endless indecision that characterizes Prufrock's
timidity; he is a stranger in the twentieth century.
In the James story, at least, the protagonist finds
fulfillment in recalled memories which allow him to see
beyond "the arrangements of pretended hourly time that
dash themselves forever to pieces,"18 something

14
that Prufrock is incapable of.

The James character

says, "There are so many connections--there will be so
many.

I feel now . . . they must all come up

”19
again.

Is James suggesting that modern man can

find resolution in such recalled experiences?

Probably

not, but this could have been what first attracted
Eliot to the relatively obscure story of Mr.
White-Mason.

In the "Graduation" poem, there is a calm

assurance that "the passing years/ . . . shall not have
power to quench the memory"(PWEY, p. 15).
Miller minimizes the influence of Bergson on
Eliot, saying that "it would be difficult to find two
intuitions of time more different in quality"(p. 146).
It is not necessarily the quality of Bergson's time
that Eliot adopts, but rather his belief in the power
of memory to initiate transcendent intuition.

It is

quite possible that Eliot saw hope for modern man in
his ability to grasp his own memories and to weigh them
in much the same way that the Symbolists achieved
synthesis by the sharp juxtaposition of unrelated
images.

There is a sense in which an individual can

become almost victimized by his thoughts and immediate
experiences but, like Bradley's hermeneutic, perception
need not shape consciousness if used effectively as a
tool for conceptualization.
It is the arrangement of otherwise irrational
ideas that Eliot sees in the Symbolists which gives him

15
a suitable form with which to begin his quest for a
suitable answer to the overwhelming metaphysical
question.
A

We sense that he has exhausted the world of

his ideas and is ready to push off into a sea of
darkness, courageously, because therein lies hope.
Bergson had also found empiricism bankrupt and had
turned to psychology for a solution.

There is no

denying that Eliot's poems from this period are
strongly "psychological"--one reason why Miller's
thesis may seem so convincing--but it must be
remembered that memory and experience are only tools
with which to intuit reality.

Bergson suggests a

reality of continual flux that can, nevertheless, be
frozen in "time capsule" images.

For the philosopher,

this means memory; for Eliot, poetry.

Both are founded

on a principle that is foreign to Miller, because both
suggest resolution and coherence.
Eliot is purposely paradoxical when he says that
"it is this contrast between fixity and flux .
which is the very life of verse"(SP, p. 33).

Aware of

the problematics of his own vision, he is content to
avoid any kind of philosophical dogmatism, monistic or
otherwise.

As early as 1959, Kenner saw that

"discussion of the poems . . . slips off into ideas,
20
when it doesn't begin there."
Even though Eliot's poetic career does not begin
with ideas, his life was to become a search for

16
artistic and philosophical unity.

By the time he had

finished Four Quartets the fusion had taken place.

But

the result was not a monism, as Miller suggests, but
rather an affirmation of the real existence of subject
and object, accompanied by metaphysical and aesthetic
reconciliation.

In the meantime, however, Eliot is not

ready to lock himself in Prufrock's cell.
continue to probe.

He must

He must go in search of his own

artistic Grail.
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In Search of the Grail (1920-1930)

Let the son of Gahmuret ride on!
for suffering lies in store for him,
albeit joy and honour also.
(Parzival, book V)
In 1925, Eliot published The Waste Land, the poem
for which he was to become best known.

This second

decade also saw him become the most influential voice
in modern criticism with the publication of The Sacred
Wood, the collection that included what might be called
his early critical trilogy: "Tradition and the
Individual Talent"(1919), "The Metaphysical
Poets"(1921), and "The Function of Criticism"(1923).
There has been considerable disagreement about the
compatibility between Eliot's theory and practise from
this period, but a close examination of the work
indicates that the criticism, in particular the three
crucial essays already mentioned, provides an
articulate expression of the method with which the
poetry is worked out, insofar as prose can accomplish
that task; we must therefore strive to see all of
Eliot's work as a unified effort.1
It is one thing to say that in these years Eliot
abandons the formal study of philosophy in favour of a
19

20
solution in poetic form;

2

it i s quite another to

say, as John Crowe Ransom has, that "the poet clashed
with the critic."3

In "The Music of Poetry" Eliot

writes:

The poet, when he talks or writes about
poetry . . . is always trying to defend the
kind of poetry he is writing, or to formulate
the kind he wants to write . . . . What he
writes about poetry, in short, must be
assessed in relation to the poetry he writes.
(OPP, p. 26)
When we attempt to criticize the critic, we should at
least take the clues he gives us.

Who, after all,

having Freud on the analytical couch, would not ask
about his mother?
Curiously, Miller manages to conveniently ignore
those parts of Eliot's theory that run directly against
the Poets of Reality thesis.

In "Tradition and the

Individual Talent," written just a year after Prufrock
and Other Observations, there is a clear denial of
monism in light of a search for unifying centres.

"The

ode of Keats," we are told, "contains a number of
feelings which have nothing particular to do with the
nightingale, but which the nightingale • • . served to
bring together"(SE, p. 9).

Here is--according to the

categories of Abrams--a severely objective
interpretation of one so often called "expressive."
The true value of the nightingale symbol lies not in
the way it is perceived, but in its ability "to bring
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things together."
work.

This is the objective correlative at

Eliot follows in the tradition of one whose

endeavour "to see the object as in itself it really is"
helped bring classical objectivity to modern criticism.
Interestingly, Arnold too has fallen prey to a
similarly romantic interpretation in Miller's The
4
Disappearance of God.
Eliot goes on to give us his chemical formula for
the composition of truly objective poetry:

When the two gases [oxygen and sulphur
dioxide] . . . are mixed in the presence of a
filament of platinum, they form sulphurous
acid. This combination takes place only if
the platinum is present; nevertheless the
newly formed acid contains no trace of the
platinum, and the platinum itself is
apparently unaffected; has remained inert,
neutral, and unchanged. The mind of the poet
is the shred of platinum. (SE, p. 7)

In this way, the creative element remains crucial, but
is prevented from giving way to subjectivism.

This is

the very method that Eliot employs in The Waste Land.
Tieresias, the poem's central figure and probably a
symbol for the artist's mind, is a seer and not
primarily a creator.

He perceives things as they are;

his role is sheer objectivity--this is part of his
pain.

(And I Tieresias have foresuffered all
Enacted on this same divan or bed;
I who have sat by Thebes below the wall
And walked among the lowest of the dead.)
(CPP, p. 44,1
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Recent publications, such as Peter Ackroyd's
5
T.S. Eliot: A Life, have resulted in extremes of
biographical interpretation.

Such criticism is useful,

as far as it goes, but does not necessarily suggest
inconsistency on the poet's part.

For as long as we

can continue to see the artist's mind as the catalyst
which serves to bring experience together, Ulysses will
continue to be more than a book about Joyce and Sons
and Lovers more than a biography of Lawrence.

But the

willingness with which he subjects his work to the
surgical pen of Ezra Pound is perhaps the best evidence
for Eliot's strong belief in the suppression of the
artistic ego.
Eliot's view of the literary tradition works on
the same principle: "No poet, no artist of any art, has
his complete meaning alone.

His significance, his

appreciation is the appreciation of his relationship to
the dead poets and artists"(SE, p. 4). The emphasis is
on the "tradition" and not any single artist's creative
process.

The tradition becomes an absolute force by

which the artist, if he is successful, is guided.
is the personal muse of antiquity.

Gone

In this light,

Eliot's use of The Golden Bough is no mystery: he is,
once again, working with the essentially universal.
His concern is not with personal experience but with
culture as the vehicle which brings it together.

The

23
vegetation myths of Frazer weave themselves in and out
of the Grail tapestry, bringing the perennial hope of
fertiliy to "the dead land."

The synthetic methods by

which both Frazer and Weston attempt to amalgamate
disparate mythology yield finished products that are
understandably appealing to the poet of The Waste Land.
In the introduction to From Ritual to Romance
Jessie Weston had said,

Were I not convinced that the theory
advocated in the following pages contains in
itself the elements that will resolve these
conflicting ingredients into one harmonious
compound I should hardly feel justified in
offeringo further contribution to the
subject.

Miss Weston's business was, then, synthesis, an attempt
to bring unity to the fragmented sources of the Grail
legend.

It was no accident that Eliot chose her

particular assimilation of the legend as the basis for
his own project.

Like the composition of The Waste

Land, the evolution of the story of Parcival was the
work of various cultural traditions and not merely the
invention of one writer.

It was central to East and

West and yet belonged to none, in that numetous
influences had converged and had therefore given it an
impersonal quality.

The contributing authors had been

"catalysts," unconscious servants of a higher order.
Charles Hartman tells us that, for Eliot, "poems are
not created out of nothing by the poet, but somehow
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exist before he writes them down."
'
M.H. Abrams' The Mirror and the Lamp theory is by
now familiar to all of us.

His schema for "objective

art"8 is simple, but useful:

NATURE

1
WORK

ARTIST

AUDIENCE

In Eliot's case, we might substitute, quite
comfortably, the "tradition" for the "work," thereby
making the shift from "art for art's sake" to "art for
the sake of culture."

It is not the self, nor even the

poem, but the literary tradition that is absolute in
Eliot's mind.

It is here that Eliot most strongly

differs from the critics with whom he has been so
freely associated.

If Eliot is the father of New

Criticism, then the Fugitives must be the disobedient
sons who, whilst rallying under his banner
"objectivity," like the deconstruction critics, isolate
the text at the virtual exclusion of supporting
data--not at all the method with which Eliot himself
approaches the discussion of literary works in his own
essays.

Nor would Eliot have any apologies for liberal

materialists like Peter Widdowson whose audience takes
precedence over a tradition which doesn't exist.9
Undoubtedly, Miller would have us put Eliot himself in
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the middle of the picture, making his art chiefly
expressive, a legacy of nineteenth century Romanticism,
for which there are some strong words in "The Function
of Criticism."

"For those who obey the inner voice,"

we read, "nothing that I can say about criticism will
have the slightest value"(SP, p. 72).

Curiously,

Miller isolates the poetry, rarely looking at the
criticism that renders his interpretation suspect.
"The difference [between Classicism and Romanticism]
seems to me," says Eliot, "the difference between the
complete and fragmentary, the adult and the immature,
the orderly and the chaotic"(SP, p. 70).

And yet, the

chaotic and the fragmentary are all that Miller manages
to see in Eliot.

By separating the poet from the

critic, as Ransom has done, he has given himself the
liberty to decorate The Waste Land with his own
prejudices.

It is an easy target for, being perhaps

the most enigmatic piece of this century, it has been
subject to many extremes of interpretation.

Because it

is such a difficult poem, most are content to merely
probe metaphors whilst denying any underlying
10
theme.

According to Miller, the images "are

thrown together in pell-mell confusion"(p. 145),
implying that Eliot is relying on, if anything, the
"Whiggery" that he so strongly condemns in "The
Function of Criticism."

As we have already seen,

appearance is not reality, and it is not the
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broken-ness that the poet wishes us to see, but the
inter-relatedness of objects, a lesson learned from
John Donne.
In "The Metaphysical Poets," Eliot ascribes to
Donne and his school the position of "the direct
current of English poetry"(SE, p. 250).

In so doing,

he almost single-handedly brought about a re-evaluation
of the seventeenth century poetic tradition.

Saying

that Ben Jonson's poetry was not necessarily
"mainstream" was indeed a bold statement, but we may
suppose that he was not altogether without motive since
the similarities between Donne's art and his own are
substantial.

In both Donne and Eliot there is an acute

sense of cosmological disorder.

Eliot remarks that "in

the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility
set in from which we have never recovered"(SE, p. 247).
Indeed, Donne has often been called a "modern" in
spirit.

A.G. George notes that "in the stark realism,

the disillusionment of Donne's poetry, one gets a
foretaste of the twentieth century view of man. ull
Surely this was the main appeal to the poet facing not
an Elizabethan England in an age of shifting values but
a post-war Europe challenged by an equally uncertain
future.

The cyclical nature of aesthetic theory had

brought about a revolt against Georgian Romanticism on
the part of the moderns; thus Eliot regarded his
seventeenth century counterparts as closer relatives
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than the intervening centuries could have given
Donne had had his own wasteland.

According to

Tillyard, he "thought the whole creation corrupt in its
12
decrepitude."

This state of affairs was manifest

in the severe aesthetic problem that Eliot called
"dissociation."

Emotion and intellect, he felt, had

been fragmented, and it was the artist's place to
reconcile them.

Donne, like Webster, was able "to

probe the skull beneath the skin," and therefore, by
applying his perceptive conceit emerged successfully,
reassembling the shattered pieces of sensibility "in a
new unity."

To suggest that a return to monism is

involved here is to fail to see the continued schism
between art and idea, even in The 4.s
. iste Land.

Although

}liot may choose certain "philosophical" materials for
his poetry, he tells us that "its truth or falsity
•

. ceases to matter"(SP, p. 65).

What is important,

however, is that the artist continues to strive to
overcome dissociation by creating a complex pattern of
otherwise discrete elements in the hope that their true
inter-relatedness will overcome.

By being "more and

more comprehensive, more and more allusive, more
indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if
necessary," the poet must attempt to forge "language
into his meaning"(SP, p. 65).

This is why we see

elements of Shakespeare, St. John, and the Buddha side
by side--the problem of unity and diversity demands a
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solution in form.

Had Miller looked closely at "The

Metaphysical Poets," he might have caught a glimpse of
himself, the ordinary man, whose

experience is chaotic, irregular,
fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or
reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have
nothing to do with each other, or with the
noise of the typewriter or the smell of
cooking; in the mind of the poet these
experiences are always forming new wholes.
(SE, p. 247)
Immediate experience, no matter how perscnal, becomes
universal in poetry.
Nowhere in Eliot's poetry is his critical theory
more blatantly put than "Whispers of Immortality."
There is an almost coy respect for Donne and the
Metaphysicals:

Daffodil bulbs instead of balls
Stared from the sockets of the eyes!
He knew that thought clings round dead limbs
Tightening its lusts and luxuries.
Donne, I suppose was such another
Who found no substitute for sense,
To seize and clutch and penetrate;
Expert beyond experience. (CPP, p. 32)

"I will show you fear," says the narrator of The Waste
Land, "in a handful of dust."

It was Donne's use of

the shocking image, the word made flesh, that Eliot
also admired, his ability to get to the core of the
matter at hand.

"Racine and Donne," he says, "looked

into a good deal more than the heart."

In other words,

their ability to look beyond the mere subjective
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experience of the romantics took them "into the
cerebral cortex, the nervous system, and the digestive
tracts"(SE, p. 250).

In this way, the human experience

becomes a microcosm, the poetic method itself a
pseudo-metaphysic:

And even the Abstract Entities
Circumambulate her charm;
But our lot crawls between dry ribs
To keep our metaphysics warm. (CPP, p. 33)

Eliot's method, then, is hardly madness, and
The Waste Land escapes dislocation by finding primary
meaning in its unifying symbol, the Quest for the
Grail.

In his response to Ulysses, Eliot had said that

"instead of the narrative method, we may now use the
mythic method"(p. 178).

If Joyce had his classical

model, Eliot had a medieval one.

Parcival's quest for

the legendary relic becomes for Eliot a symbol for his
own life--what Grover Smith has called "the idealist's
13
quest for union."

If Prufrock, like Parcival,

was unable to ask "the overwhelming question," Eliot
himself was determined to set things right.

Although

the Grail legend was the legacy of another age, Eliot
converts the quester's search for a solution into a
modern epic.

"The real decline," says Northrop Frye,

"is from an ideal which may be symbolized by medieval
culture, but remains in the present to condemn and
14
challenge the contemporary world."
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So strong was Eliot's conviction, and so sure was
he of the task's magnitude, that The Waste Lane vision
becomes no less than religious.

By "Dans le

Restaurant" the poet had already assumed for himself
the mystical role of priest for modern man.

The poem

tells of a meeting between a young man and a dirty old
garcon who recounts, penitently, his first sexual
experiences with a young female, possibly a prototype
for the hyacinth girl.

Written in 1920, just two years

before The Waste Land, the poem states quite clearly
the position of the poet in Eliot's mind.

The decrepit

waiter, who is more akin to Prufrock than any other
character in the poems, slobbers ("Do I dare to eat a
peach?") and is the victim of age and decadence ("I
grow old, I grow old.")
Eliot himself.

The patron we may assume to be

Although Eliot was in France in 1920,

the actuality of the meeting's ever having taken place
is not really relevant.

What is important, however, is

that we see the poet as priest, the old waiter his
confessor.

The young man's parting admonition is

ironic, bearing all the marks of a mock-religious
ritual:

Va t'en te decrotter les rides du visage;
Tiens, ma fourchette, cicrasse:toi le crane.
De quel droit payes-tu des experiences comme
moi?
Tiens, voil dix sous, pour la
i5
salle-de-bains.
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Indeed, what right had the waiter to tell these things?
Although such behaviour is offensive, it is the poet's
lot to see to the soul, regardless of how putrid.

In

this way, the old man is representative of all that
confronted Eliot in 1920.

The land had indeed been

laid waste and the pieces, he felt, were his to pick
up.
In "Le Directeur" the poet is called "spectateur."
He is a stranger in a land contaminated by a corrupt
government, ironically called "conservateur."
Thames,

The

symbol for Western culture, is polluted as it

flows through the land from which it is somehow
detached: "Malheur a la malheureuse Tamise"(CPP,
p. 28).

All is decadent but the tradition (water) and

the artist (youth).

The Thames image reoccurs in The

Waste Land, as the poet calls, "Sweet Thames, run
softly, till I end my song," mourning the river with
"cardboard boxes, cigarette ends"(CPP, p. 42) as
evidence of its pollution.

In the Fisher King legend

the lack of rain causes stagnation.

One feels that if

the poet ever does end his song, things will be well
again.

For now, Europe is rotten to the core and it is

the poet's job to resolve the situation by bringing
things together in aesthetic ritual.
We see youth and age again in "Gerontion:" "Here I
an:, an old man in a dry month,/Being read to by a boy,
waiting for rain."

Even here we see hints of the
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Fisher King legend.

His home is "a decayed house."

He

remembers "the juvescence of the year" when "came
Christ the tiger/To be eaten, to be divided, to be
drunk/Among whispers"(CPP, pp. 21,22).

But as we learn

from "Dans le Restaurant," the precious cargo has been
lost.

The poem's conclusion constitutes the "Death By

Water" section of The Waste Land, with some minor
differences:

Phl6bas, le Ph-e-nicien, pendant quinze jours

noye,
Oubliait les cris des mouettes et la houle de
Cournouail le,
Et les profits et les pertes, et la cargaison
d'etain:
Un coffant de sous-mer l'emporta tres
loin.

What is this strange "cargo of pewter?"
lost in "the Cornish sea?"

Why was it

One explanation may be that

Eliot was already thinking of the mystical chalice,
traditionally associated with the court of Arthur,
according to legend, situated in Cornwall.

Could it be

that this little poem, written in French and rarely
translated, holds the key to the motivation behind The
Waste Land?

If so, this is where Eliot first finds his

calling: "Figurez-vous donc,

c16tait un

sorte

pgnible:/Cependant, cc fut jadis un bel homme, de haute
taille."

Very literally, we might say that these lines

are telling us to consider the fate of one who was once
a tall and handsome man but has been transformed by

33
some terrible ordeal.

Smith has suggested that "Dans

17
and
le Restaurant" is "full of puns and ironies,"
is best understood on a hidden level.

In Mr.

Fugenides' "demotic French" we may find ourselves with
an alternate translation: "Create, therefore, this is a
terrible task:/However, it will make a tall and
beautiful man."

Eliot has put himself in the place of

the Grail hero.

Coming after the episode with the old

waiter, there is a sense in which a prophetic challenge
has been issued.

If the poet fails to "create" and

merely leaves us with fragmentation, the Grail will not
be found.

But judging by the metaphysical method and

the very content that he brings to The Waste Land,
Eliot is determined to bring synthesis and, in due
time, heal the external world.
Although Eliot more than once called himself a
classicist, it is difficult to believe that he regarded
himself after the order of, say, Homer or Sophocles.
He believed, rather, that a modern poet should, like
Dante, be somewhat a product of his age.

And in an age

as complex as our own it becomes increasingly difficult
to speak of art in terms of "Classicism" and
"Romanticism," for such categories now lack necessary
precision.

It is impossible to look at Eliot's New

Classicism without recognizing the seminal influence of
T.E. Hulme on his perception of the place and purpose
of art.18

In predicting a classical revival Hulme
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had paved the way for Eliot's vision.

This modern

Classicism, said Hulme, would "be different because it
has passed through a romantic period."19

He

therefore recognizes a new dichotomy with which to
classify all aesthetic endeavour: "vital" and
"geometric" art.

The Waste Land belongs to the latter.

Vital art, which is more akin to the old
Romanticism of Rousseau and Wordsworth, presupposes the
innate goodness of man in a benevolent universe and the
ultimate freedom of the ego to succeed on its own
terms.

Ironically, the freedom of the vital position

is finally illusory because it is forced to justify
itself on metaphysical grounds, thereby making itself
nothing more than "spilt religion."20

It is this

exact problem that drives Eliot towards geometric form
which, on the other hand, recognizes the imperfect ego
in a broken environment and places emphasis on object
over emotion, form over freedom, and art over idea.
According to Hulme, only this kind of art can bring
about "adjustment between man and the outside
21
world."
If The Waste Land is about alienation,
t represents, at the same time, an artificial attempt
to restore cosmological order.

This is at the heart of

the Grail story; by asking the appropriate question,
Parcival will heal the Fisher King and restore the
land.
In his essay on "Baudelaire" Eliot cites Hulme's
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position on original sin.

It is because of "original

sin" or "dissociation" that man's perception of his
place in the cosmos is perverted.

Frye says that

Eliot's

ordinary personality is Rousseau's noble
savage: it regards the community as a
limitation of its freedom, and judges the
community according to the amount of
inconvenience to the ego that it causes.
Eliot starts from Burke's vw that society
is prior to the individual.
Far from being evidence of the romantic tendency,
therefore, The Waste Land becomes another indictment of
it--with one difference: as a picture of fallen man in
a degenerate society, it is an attempt to go beyond or
see through its context.

While Eliot may appear to

immerse himself in the negative element, he is careful
to tell us that the "illusion is being disillusioned"
(SP, p. 368).

The epigraphs from Conrad show the

kinship that he shares with the novelist who also
appears to have embraced the negative, at least in
Miller's mind.23

Nevertheless, Eliot, like

Conrad's Jim, avoids drowning in a sea of nihilism by
treading water with artistic finesse.
The vulnerability of his position leads Eliot to
no conclusive metaphysical system in The Waste Land.
"The poet's job," he had said, was "to express the
greatest emotional intensity of his time, based on
whatever his time happened to think"(SE, pp. 117-118),
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and there is nothing to suggest that, by this time, he
had modified this position.

Eliot does, however, take

personal comfort in his creative endeavour.

We are to

take him quite seriously when he tells us, "These
fragments I have shored against my ruins."

The poem

represents, in other words, a bulwark against which the
tides of nihilism can only lap.

According to Derek

Traversi,

The final lines may be taken as a summary of
the position reached by the poet as a result
of this particular creative effort. . . . He
is still in sight of the "arid plain"--the
Waste Land through which we have passed with
him--but it is now behind him, in a sense
overpassed. . . . The individual can at least
aspire to some measure of control over his
own existence, and that it is his human
obligation, even in a time of desolation, to
achieve such degrw of personal order as is
within his reach.

He had at least put his own lands in order and had
subsequently given himself a clear view of the problem
as it existed.

The solution, it seems, was not to come

until 1930 with the final phase of his development.
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appearances in the wilderness"(p. 73), but goes on to
proclaim that "the human world is a lie.

All human

ideals, even the ideal of fidelity, are lies. . . .
They derive from man himself and are supported by
nothing outside him"(p. 17).
24
T.S. Eliot: The Longer Poems (London:
Harcourt, 1976), pp. 52-55.

The Fire and the Rose (1930-1945)

Yet had the land been
waste, but by his coming had
folk and land alike been
delivered.
(Diu Crone)

"Ash Wednesday" represents the wafershed in
Eliot's life.

It is the bittersweet moment of his

maturing vision, a point of transition--not reversal.
Some critics felt betrayed as Eliot moved closer to a
philosophic art.

Allen Tate, saying that "the historic

religious mode is illegitimate," remarked bitterly that
"critics are a little less able to see the poetry for
1
Westminster Abbey."

Tate's vision was too narrow

to accept the all-consuming purpose that drove Eliot to
a synthesis of art and idea.

It is perhaps unfair to

judge his disappointment harshly, knowing what we know
today, for we are looking back with time on our side.
The dust has settled, and we are now able to see that
there were hints all along in Eliot's development that
suggested only one direction.

2

Eliot saw his own evolution as progressive, and
not as a series of self-negating positions, each
isolated from those before.

This development is the

subject of "Landscapes," a collection of vignettes in
4()
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verse, each representing a stage of life, from the
"first world" of childhood to the "aged eagle" of old
age.

Not only is the poem contemporary with Four

Quartets, but its images and language are strikingly
similar:

Children's voices in the orchard
Between the blossom- and the fruit-time:
Golden head, crimson head,
Between the green tip and the root.
Black wing, brown wing, hover over;
Twenty years and the spring is over;
To-day grieves, to-morrow grieves,
Cover me over, light-in-leaves;
Golden head, black wing,
Cling, swing,
Spring, sing,
Swing up into the apple-tree. (CPP, p. 93)

This opening section, "New Hampshire," is the first of
a chronological catalogue.

These are the "children's

voices" heard in "Burnt Norton," the lost youth that
the Harvard years buried.

He is remembering a time

"between the green tip and the root," probably
adolescence before the pain of manhood.

The children,

trees, and birds convey a deep longing for freshness
and power, yet the human stance is grief.

The

"Virginia" section takes us into The Waste Land years:

Red river, red river,
Slow flow heat is silence
No will is still as a river
Still . . .
Delay, decay. Living, living,
Never moving. Ever moving
Iron thoughts came with me
And go with me:
Red river, river, river. (CPP, p. 94)

$
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Here Eliot, even if Tate and others were not
sympathetic, shows that the order of nature is
mechanical and changeless, and not sufficient for the
hunger of the soul.

The third section, "Usk," is the

most interesting and stylistically superior.

It shows

a distinct change in direction, probably supplemental
to the "Ash Wednesday" experience:

Do not suddenly break the branch, or
Hope to find
The white hart behind the white well.
Glance aside, not for the lance, do not spell
Old enchantments. Let them sleep.
"Gently dip, but not too deep,"
Lift your eyes
Where the roads dip and where the roads rise
Seek only there
Where the grey light meets the green air
The hermit's chapel, the pilgrim's prayer.
(CPP, p. 94)
The Christian grail quest goes beyond the world of
nature.

The pilgrim has arrived at "the empty chapel,"

only to find that he must "turn aside," reiecting any
simplistic return to old myths, looking ahead towards
belief and deity.

This is exactly where Eliot differs

from Yeats; merely human perfection is simply not
enough for the human soul, and the old myths cannot be
revived.

The pilgrim's prayer, the poet's voice, has

found a dwelling in the hermit's chapel, a metaphysical
home beyond nature, in the realm of meditation.
Eliot's movement is paralleled and illustrated by
his changing attitude towards the theory of Paul Elmer
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More.

In The Sacred Wood Eliot maintained that More

was "led astray . . . by his guide Sainte-Beauve
(because) neither . . . is primarily interested in
art"(SW, p. 40).

More had always believed that art was

inseparable from morals and, as a follower of Babbitt,
the young Eliot had seen fit to accuse him of being the
model of the imperfect critic because "an interest in
morals will not produce sound criticism of art."3
This is hardly surprising because, as we have seen,
until 1930 Eliot had endeavoured to divorce his art
from metaphysics.

But as he moved towards the

synthesis of "Ash Wednesday," Eliot was able to make
the concession that he expresses in the introduction to
After Strange Gods:

Some years ago I wrote an essay entitled
"Tradition and the Individual Talent."
During the course of the subsequent fifteen
years I have discovered . . . some
unsatisfactory phrasing and at least one or
more doubtful analogy. But I do not
repudiate what I wrote in that essay any more
fully than I should expect to do after such a
lapse of time. The problem, naturally, does
not seem to me so simple as it seemed then,
nor could I treat it now as a purely literary
one.
(ASG, p. 15)
Eliot does not countermand his earlier position and, as
Northrop Frye has said, "the new attitude was
consistent enough with the earlier one, only the
content being changed,.4 but Eliot does see now the
need for the mutual accommodation of art with
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metaphysics and faith.

In "Religion and Literature"

this accomodation is brought sharply into focus when
Eliot affirms that "literary criticism should be
completed from a definite ethical and theological
standpoint"(SE, p. 343).

Not surprisingly this change

was reflected in a renewed view of More, whom he now
called

5
the finest literary critic of our time,"

saying that in More "I came to find an auxiliary to my
own progress of thought, which no English theologian at
the time could have given me."6

If this is true,

'
then Eliot's calling More an "Anglican Platonist"
should tell us something of his own position.

Harry

Antrim recognizes that in the Quartets

Images of God are not . . . mere creations of
man's own image-making propensity but are at
worst faint copies of what God introduces
into the stream of time and space, at belt
fair copies of the image of God Himself.

This is the traditional Christian content couched in
Plato's dualism.

As a result of his view of the

collective tradition, Eliot had more than once
associated his Classicism with Christian orthodoxy, and
this is what appealed most about The Greek Tradition,
which he considered "More's greatest wo/k.

. . a

masterly treatment of the process through which Greek
9
thought influences Christianity."

This was

reiterated in his interest in Christopher Dawson's
treatises on religion and culture which followed a
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similar line of reasoning, resulting in Eliot's own
"Idea of a Christian Society," itself modelled on the
Athenian social ideal.

For Miller to say that Eliot

had "abandoned . • . his identification with the mind
of Europe"(p. 183) and to read monism into such a
position is absurd since it is this cultural orthodoxy
that, in After Strange Gods, Eliot sets in opposition
to the heretical romantic heterodoxy.

Miller, once

again, simply re-writes Eliot's life to make it endorse
the very Romanticism which it rejects.

James Gribble

has recently pointed out that the problem of
parochialism in much post-structuralism stems from "the
10
subordination of criticism to theory."

Such

subordination, he claims, hinders the deconstruction
critic from approaching his subject on its own terms.
Miller himself warns against such subjectivism
"exclusively derived . . . from the experiences of a
self-enclosed mind" lest the critic finds himself
"unwittingly making over in his own image.,11
Ironically, this is exactly what Miller has done with
The Disappearance of God and Poets of Reality.

In an

attempt to approach two very diverse ages thematically,
he has made his theory an end in itself rather than
keeping it secondary and has subsequently made Eliot
over in his own subjective image.
"When religious feeling disappears," says Eliot,
"the words in which the poet struggled to express it
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become meaningless"(OPP, p. 15).

Central to his final

vision is the importance of linguistic resolution.
"Any study of Eliot," says Harry Antrim, "must . • •
center on his understanding of language"(p. 3).

Eliot

had often said that communication was a matter of word
choice, and it had been Prufrock's inability "to say
exactly" what he really meant that caused so much
frustration.

In The Waste Land the misinterpretation

of the nightingale's "inviolable voice" yields only
"Jug Jug" in dirty ears, and in "Ash Wednesday" the
noisy world continuously competes with "the Word."
Always there is the conscious "raid on the
inarticulate," and this is at the heart of the poet'3
struggle and the measure of his creative success.

To

acknowledge that there is a right word, a proper
symbol, is to make a basic assumption about language
and its relation to reality, to reader, and to poet.
According to Harold Bloom,

Language, in relation to poetry, can be
conceived in two valid ways. . . . Either one
can believe in a magical theory of all
language, as the Kabbalists, many poets, and
Walter Benjamin did, or else one must yield
to a throughgoing linguistic nihilism, which
in its most refird mode is now called
Deconstruction.

Bloom's comment, besides being a deplorable example of
the black-white fallacy, is interesting since it
appears in the Deconstruction and Criticism collection,
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alongside a more recent essay by Hillis Miller entitled
"The Critic as Host" in which he fully establishes
himself as a proponent of the latter view, that
metaphysics is merely "a phantom generated within the
house of language by the play of language."13
Language, then, ceases to be a symbol for objective
reality but instead creates its own subjective reality.
All is self-referential and nothing is absolute.

In

T.S. Eliot's Concept of Language, whose direction,
claims its author, Harry Antrim, "was largely suggested
by Poets of Reality"(p. 2), we read that "being itself
subjectivized, language can communicate, ultimately,
with no one but its user"(p. 5).

While Antrim is wrong

to see any such position in the early Eliot, he steps
out from the shadow of Miller to assert his own very
honest synthetic view of the later poetry:

Belief in Incarnation enables Eliot to
take hold of a world in which language is
something other than what the mind makes of
it. Language can be a means of both real
communication and thus may be especially
useful when overtly public. (p. 3)
And so whilst Antrim commends Miller, he must dismiss
his final assessment and calls his own last chapter
"The Romantic Inheritance Overcome."

Although he

should have perhaps given more thought to the
importance of the Logos in the Incarnation, Antrim
claims that somewhere between The Waste Land and "Ash

4t)
Wednesday" Eliot abandons his earlier idealism for a
belief in the "extrinsic meaning"(p. 44) that comes
with Christian thought: "After 1935, Eliot's poetry and
drama are everywhere filled with the realizations of
external reality"(p. 57).

Four Quartets is indeed full

of concrete images for which the appropriate word is in
no way ambiguous.
is being said.

We know, clearly and precisely, what

Even Eliot's abstract ideas are crisp

and intact, evidence of the seriousness with which he
approaches the Logos, the point at which he thinks all
correct aesthetic and religious theories converge.

The

poet, by theorizing skillfully, himself dances around
the "still point" and as a result touches the mind of
God at momentary points along the locus.

In order to

take such a logocentric stance, the poet, out of
philosophic necessity, adopts a belief in the
absoluteness of words in order to fulfil his
responsibility "to purify the dialect of the tribe."
So much for the movement towards monism and language
games.
Gregory S. Jay, unwilling to let Eliot out of the
subjective prisonhouse, has more recently provided us
with a Derridean deconstruction of Eliot's poetics, in
which he suggests that Four Quartets is not a movement
towards solution but only "enlightened disillusion14
ment."

Such interpretations, after Miller,

should not surprise us; they are becoming more
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commonplace as the new radical Romanticism gains
momentum.

We must remember, however, that this is a

movement to which Eliot laid no claim at any stage, and
it is impossible that had he been alive today he would
have sat still for such perverse misreadings.
In "Ash Wednesday" the poet verifies his belief in
the Johannine Logos, a power which warrants sweeping
objective correlatives, a power flowing from the "still
point":

If the lost word is lost, if the spent word
is spent
If the unheard, unspoken
Word is unspoken, unheard;
Still is the unspoken word, the Word unheard,
The Word without a word, the Word within
The world and for the world;
And the light shone in darkness and
Against the Word the unstilled world still
whirled
About the centre of the silent Word.
(CPP, p. 65)
In Eliot's opinion language does not imprison
metaphysics but, as Aristotle taught, is an effective
tool for the conceptualization of reality, a tool to be
mastered.

In Miller, all that exists is the word

spoken; but for Eliot, there is a Platonic ideal,
communicable only in a special and precise language
which employs liturgical repetition and logical
metaphor.

For Eliot, this is the cause of his constant

struggle whichi in

"Burnt Norton," shows the poet still

fighting the "voices of temptation"(CPP, p. 122):
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Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in
place,
Will not stay still. (CPP, p. 121)

At first, this might look like the beginning of a
deconstructive linguistic, but as we move through the
Quartets we see the poet come to rest elsewhere.

If

"Burnt Norton" is the first leg of the spiritual
journey then "Little Gidding" is home and shows final
faith in a language sufficient to hold up under the
stress and, like the Chinese jar, reach beyond its
stillness:

. . . every phrase
And sentence that is right (where every word
is at home,
Taking its place to support the others,
The word neither diffident nor ostentatious,
An easy commerce of the old and the new,
The common word exact without vulgarity,
The formal word precise but not pedantic,
The complete consort dancing together)
Every phrase and every sentence is an end and
a beginning,
Every poem an epitaph. (CPP, p. 144)
Besides the obviously mature tone that comes with
time, Eliot's poetic method had changed very little.
His new belief in philosophic art he illustrates with a
final metaphysical conceit, a thoroughly modern
adaptation of a clearly seventeenth century form:

The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel

L 1

The sharp compassion of the healer's art
Resolving the enigma of the fever chart.
(CPP, p. 127)
Even the masculine rhyme and iambic tetrameter are
characteristic of Donne's school.

In "The Music of

Poetry" Eliot had said that the form should fit the
content, and his choice of oxymoron in this section
serves well the idea of religious paradox--"All the
world's a hospital"--and the difficult concept of
trinity is illustrated by three ironic personalities:
"the wounded surgeon," "the dying nurse," and the
"ruined millionaire."

The form is symmetrical and

works with the content to give one stanza to each
crucial part of the redemptive process: the Spirit, the
Son, the Father, the individual ego, and finally the
reconciliation in the practise of Eucharist: "The
dripping blood our only drink,/The bloody flesh our
only food"(CPP, p. 128).
On a larger scale, the Four Quartets themselves
hold together thematically as the record of a spiritual
journey; from the uncertainty of the first poem,
through darkness, to the resolution of the last, Eliot
follows a musical pattern, each poem its own movement
and yet an intrinsic part of the larger symphony.
The final and most obvious argument against Miller
is that Eliot becomes an Anglican and could not have
embraced such a system of belief without recognizing
the real existence of subject and object.

The Grail
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Quest was now given a context in Christian dogma.

The

cosmological adjustment that is brought about by the
Incarnation, the point at which the natural meets the
supernatural in space and time, provides an answer to
the problem of separation for both the individual and
the "dead land."

The implications of the Ash Wednesday

liturgy had undoubtedly brought Eliot face to face with
his own mortality and whether or not we agree with his
final position, we must say that he appears secure in
it when he unashamedly announces that

I am convinced that if this "supernatural" is
suppressed . . . the dualism of man and
nature collapses at once. Man is man because
he can recognize supernatural realities, not
because he can invent them. (SE, p. 433)
The content of Christianity fitted the framework that
he valued so well that dissociation became original
sin, the objective correlative became the Incarnation,
impersonality became humility, the tradition became the
church and its poetry the liturgy of the ages.

The

Grail took on full significance as the redemptive
vessel and "the peace that passes all understanding"
became the peace that accompanies knowledge when the
pentecostal fire is fused with the aesthetic rose.

Curiously, Miller not only comes to admit that
Eliot has a synthetic purpose in The Waste Land ("the
poet had been defined as a man who can unify
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heterogeneous elements with dancelike form"(p. 187))
but also that he embraces an almost Platonic dualism
("If Eliot comes to accept the fact that men and women
have bodies, he also comes to recover a physical world,
external to himself"(p. 185)).

This he explains by

saying that after "Ash Wednesday," however, the poet
returns to his cell: "Eliot begins in exclusion and
deprivation, then expands outward to include all time
and space, and finally narrows again"(p. 189).
In his introduction, Miller had said that "if the
disappearance of God is presupposed by much Victorian
poetry, the death of God is the starting point for many
twentieth-century writers"(p. 2).

Unable to accept

dualism in any form, he says that "Eliot too goes
beyond the vanishing of God"(p. 189).

He thinks

Eliot's new found dualism is, in other words, deceptive
since it is only really an extension of the old self.
Put, as we have seen, for Eliot, at least until 1930,
the metaphysical had not crucially mattered.

He had

not, like Neitszche, killed God; he had simply not
considered the possibility.

In his essay on

Wittgenstein and Derrida, Charles Altieri has said that
the only real way out of the subjective dialectic "is
$15
to deny the way in.

Similarly, Eliot does not

"go beyond" the death of God since he never recognizes
it in the first place.
never taken by Eliot.

The nit ilistic "way in" was
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Interestingly, Miller does not end where Eliot
does.

Miller's final choice of lines is revealing.

We

are left not with the hopeful affirmation of "the fire
and the rose," but lines that would make a better
epitaph for Miller himself than for Eliot:
Quick now, here, now, always-Ridiculous the waste sad time
Stretching before and after.
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